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Intimations of a Spiritual New Age:
I. The Spiritual Emergence and Personal Tragedy of a Universalized
Christian Mysticism in the Life and Work of Simone Weil
Harry T. Hunt

Brock University
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada
This is the first in a projected series on the envisionings during the crisis years of the 1930s
of a future spiritual New Age consequent on the coming globalization of an individualist,
capitalist, technologically driven world economy. In very different ways Jung, the philosophers
Bergson and Heidegger, the historian Toynbee, and Wilhelm Reich, foresaw an emergent
New Age consistent with a post-modern secular culture. Others such as Teilhard de Chardin,
Krishnamurti, and Gurdjieff anticipated their own potential universalizing of more mystical
aspects of the world religions. Simone Weil’s version of an essentialized mystical Christianity
is part of the latter attempts, including her proposed synthesis with a mystical Platonism,
along with her versions of Buddhism, Taoism, and Hinduism. Eschewing traditional
doctrines of Resurrection, after-life, and final judgement, Weil offered her own transpersonal
understanding of a “negative theology” of the unknowability of God other than through
states of Grace, based on the individual experience of “affliction” uniquely exemplified by
Christ on the Cross, and the beauty of the natural order. Her personal struggles throughout
her highly original mystical realization, still seen by many as an exemplary guidance toward
a Christianity of the future, and its tragic “meta-pathological” inversion in the last years of
her short life, attest to challenges entailed in non-traditional transpersonal developments
that might anticipate a spirituality of the future.
Keywords: New Age, globalization, this-worldly mysticism, negative theology,
in-existence of God, experience of Grace, affliction, spiritual meta-pathology

B

orn to a French secular Jewish family, and dying
prematurely at the age of thirty-four in 1943,
Simone Weil, well known initially in Europe for
her neo-Marxist political writings, underwent a major
spiritual opening beginning in 1938. She formulated
these experiences in terms of a potentially universalized
mystical Christianity, without doctrines of Resurrection,
personal afterlife, Annunciation, Apocalypse, or final
judgement—blended with Greek Platonism, the
Bhagavad-Gita, and aspects of Buddhism into a new kind
of “implicit faith.” It is a strikingly original “negative
theology” based on God’s inherent unknowability and
felt absence, except for the descent of Grace in moments
of total suffering and surrender most purely exemplified
by “my God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me”
(Matthew 27: 46) of Jesus on the Cross (Weil, 1947/2002,
1951/2005, 1951/2009). The postwar publication of her
spiritual essays, letters, and notebooks had a considerable

and still ongoing impact on contemporary religious
thought, along with much controversy over her lifelong
emotional struggles and their apparent inversion of her
earlier spiritual enlightenment in the final year of her
life in ways that many, then and now, have regarded as
consciously self-destructive and suicidal.
Weil, who considered her experiences as
ontologically real and transcendent, would not have
agreed with this present approach to the psychology
of spirituality as a higher or abstract development of
emotional intelligence, in the sense of Max Scheler
(1926/1970) and G. H. Mead (1934) on mystical
realization as a universalized sympathy, and further
developed as a developmental epistemology of the
transpersonal by Hunt (2016). Such an approach
might offer its own understanding of the suffering and
purgation inherent to the major spiritual traditions, in
that an abstract synthesis of feeling and a decentering
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from egocentricity must not only address the broader
human condition but will necessarily activate and
attempt to assimilate previous affective trauma and
unresolved personal issues. This is understood not in
the sense of Freud (1930) and some recent versions of
attachment theory (Rizzuto, 1979) in which God as
spiritual Absolute is reduced to a projection of the primal
parents, but rather in the sense of W. R. Bion (1970)
and Almaas (2004), in which the all encompassing
nature of transpersonal states will resonate with
unresolved issues from early childhood in their similar
quality of an encompassing totality and diffuseness.
Ideally “metabolized” and healed within direct mystical
realization, earlier trauma can also imprint and distort
subsequent spirituality in terms of what Maslow (1971)
saw as the spiritual “meta-pathologies” of despair,
grandiosity, and withdrawal, and William James (1902)
termed the potential “theopathies” of “geniuses of the
religious line”—and which in the extreme, as in the case
of Weil, may shut down into an unresolved “dark night”
(Hunt, 2007).
Simone Weil and a New Age Spirituality
here is also a broader socio-historical context
from which to understand Weil’s version of a
universalized mystical Christianity. In hindsight, at
least, the 1960s, 70s and 80s might be considered their
own circumscribed “era” rather than the beginnings of
the New Age many thought at the time.1 While left with
highly specific understandings of psychedelic therapies,
Eastern spiritualities, spontaneous ecstatic states,
neo-shamanism, and the developing neurocognition
of meditation, the longer term planetary “age” of
spiritual renewal often anticipated seems inevitably put
forward into a more distant future by the narrowing
economic impact of globalization and the shrinking
of the previously expanding educated, individualistic
middle classes that the sociologists Weber (1922/1963)
and Troeltsch (1931/1960) thought foreshadowed a
futural sensate or inner-worldly mysticism to replace the
increasingly secularized Judaic-Christian prophetical
religiosity (see Hunt, 2003, 2010). Indeed the recent
reactive fundamentalisms within Christianity, Judaism,
Islam, and even Hinduism attest to the economic
pressures that would postpone any such predictions.
While not in any way to minimize the
continuing contributions of an increasingly sophisticated
transpersonal movement within the human sciences,
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it may be more helpful for any longer term New Age
anticipations to look back to the more intuitive and
schematic formulations that cluster in the 1930s—
perhaps called forth all the more accurately and
powerfully out of the diffuse premonitions, in the face
of the distorted quasi-religions of Nazism and Stalinism,
of an unprecedated carnage to come. It was beginning
in this time that a series of seminal figures, including
Toynbee, Jung, Heidegger, Reich, Gurdjieff, and
Krishnamurti, as well as the Catholic priest Teilhard de
Chardin and Simone Weil herself, began to respond to
a widely perceived loss of meaning and purpose, only
to become more fully obvious in a beginning post-war
globalization, with a depth and insight less visible in the
more specifically focused era to follow. It may be time for
their reconsideration if we are to understand the multiple
strands—both religious and secular—that would need
to be synthesized in any future planetary New Age called
forth to compensate and reconcile a more impersonal
technologically driven globalization that seems destined
to leave a large portion of humanity superfluous to its
administration (Harari, 2016).
There were two major strands in these attempts
extending from the 1930s through the 1950s. The one was
more secularly conceived and seeking a new postmodern
understanding of the spiritual (Jung, Heidegger, Reich).
The other was more intuitively religious and seeking the
essentializing, universalizing, or right simplification of
the mystical or “perennial” center of the major world
religions. It is here that Weil becomes central in her
insistence on the ontological reality of her mystical
Christianity. Convergences among and between these
two strands become especially noteworthy in their
intuition of any future spirituality that might redeem
and balance where the planet seems headed.
To begin with attempts at religious
universalization, with respect to Christianity, key figures
include not only Weil herself but the Catholic priest
and paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin (1959, 1964)—
the major works of each only published posthumously.
Where Weil would emphasize an individual suffering
and grace separated from and transcending society,
Teilhard foresaw a future planetary civilization whose
pervasive materialism would be best reconciled through
Christian versions of a divine incarnation of all persons,
whose equality of personhood would be best unified
through an Agapic or compassionate love for which an
essentialized Christianity could provide the template.2

Hunt

There is the similar and roughly contemporaneous universalizing of Hasidic Judaism by Martin
Buber (1949, 1957/1970), and Scholem’s (1941/1961)
presentation of Kaballah, along with the GurdjieffOuspensky movement (Ouspensky, 1949) and Idries
Shah (1964) offering essentialized versions of Islamic
Sufism.3 Krishnamurti’s (1971; Landau, 1935/1964)
universalizing of Hinduism as ongoing attention/
acceptance of the ongoing moment, “without hope
or desire,” is strikingly similar to Weil (1951/2009)
on the transformative power of meditative attention,
while the earlier Theosophical movement seems to have
been the first to proclaim a coming New Age (Hakl,
2013). Meanwhile Weil herself (1956) was aware of
Suzuki’s (1933) initial presentation during those years
of a generalized Zen Buddhism, seeing its no-self of
meditative practice as similar to her own experiences of
inner emptiness. She already strongly agreed with the
notion of a “perennial philosophy.”
Weil would never have cited the more primarily
secular psychologist C. G. Jung and his naturalized
understanding of an inherent “biological” capacity for
numinous-mystical experience in terms of his collective
unconscious and its archetypal imagination. Yet Jung
(1959, 2009) independently shared with Weil a strong
influence from an earlier Gnostic Christianity—for
her Marcion and the Cathars—and both were equally
preoccupied with the Book of Job as the most direct
precursor to Christianity and the Cross (Jung, 1958;
Weil, 1951/2009). Jung (1960), in association with the
Eranos conferences that grew up around him in those
years (Hakl, 2013), also began an interest in tribal
shamanisms, dreams, and mythologies, while Weil
was developing her own parallel fascination with the
“implicit faith” she saw running through cross cultural
mythologies and European folk and fairy tales.
The philosopher Heidegger (1919/2004;
1927/1962) in these same years had already derived his
ostensibly secular existential phenomenology of human
existence, with its inherent opening to a numinous
“primordial Being experience,” from Meister Eckhart
and Augustine. Where Weil analogously utilized Plato
and Pythagorus, Heidegger (1938/2012) advocated
a return to a radical reinterpretation of the Greek preSocratics to herald his “new beginning” and futural “last
god.” Heidegger saw himself as addressing a crisis of
spiritual loss in modernity consequent on the ongoing
triumph of a technology and “machination” that

would someday reduce personhood to an economic
commodity—a version of Weil (1947/2002; 1951/2005)
on the “mechanism” of society that, absent a higher
Grace, turns persons into the “things” of an endless
dominance. Heidegger and Jung, coming from a political
conservatism that saw their brief initial fascination in
Nazism (see Hunt, 2003), and Weil, coming from a neoMarxist left, all became preoccupied in the 1930s and
1940s with a sense of cultural uprootedness and loss of
spiritual ground in the modern West. They all tried to
foresee its potential renewal—Weil in her final The Need
for Roots (1949/2002), Heidegger in his The History of
Beyng (1940/2015) and Bremen Lectures (1949/2012), and
Jung in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933). Heidegger
and Jung also shared with Weil an active interest in
Buddhism and Taoism (Parkes, 1987; Jung, 1958).4
Finally, and to contextualize in hindsight these
independently overlapping strands of a future New Age,
it was during this time that the historian Arnold Toynbee
(1946, 1956, 1957) was formulating his view of panregional universal states—Persia, Rome, China, India—
producing the similarly inclusive world religions destined
to have their still later far broader appeal and impact. Like
Weber (1922/1963), Toynbee understood the coming
capitalist-technological civilization as the secularization
of a Christianity originally based on a divine incarnation
into the material world, with a resulting implication
of the sacredness and social equality of individual
personhood. For Toynbee the extreme materialism and
individual isolation of a coming future world order can
only be made humanly tolerable through a new and
universalizing spirituality, to avoid the danger, strongly
felt by Weil (1951/2005) as well, of idolizing the power
structure of that society itself. Toynbee concluded that
such a spiritual renewal would have to involve a synthesis
of the mystical cores of the world religions, especially
a Christianity attuned to the sacredness of personhood
and the Eastern traditions of meditative realization. He
saw their shared emphasis on the necessity of humility
and love for fellow humans, along with the inevitability
of moral suffering and human limitation before the
sense of something beyond and transcendent. Yet such
a synthesis would also have to follow naturalistic lines
acceptable to such a future technological civilization—a
view consistent with Troeltsch and Weber on a future
“sensate” or this-worldly mysticism for the West. Here
Toynbee, also echoing Jung earlier, followed Bergson’s
(1907/1944) understanding of mystical experience as
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the direct amplification and expression of a spontaneous
“life energy.”
While Weil herself (1949/2002) rejected
any such Bergsonian/Nietzschean naturalistically
understood spirituality as an empty pragmatism—a
“pink pill” of vitality (p. 248), it was Wilhelm Reich
(1949/1973), the last of these New Age precursors of the
thirties and forties, who formalized Bergson’s life energy
into a cosmic “orgone energy”—potentially measurable
and the “scientific” basis for traditional mystical
experience. Reich (1953) would share with Weil an
extreme emotional suffering from societal rejection, not
to mention his final imprisonment, and so came to his
own final identification with the living Jesus, understood
with Nietzsche (1888/1954) as a Dionysian affirmation
of life itself. Weil herself (1956) saw the parallels between
the myth of Dionysius/Osiris and Jesus, and shared with
the later Reich a view of a science that should be based
not on inner mechanism but on the expressive outward
beauty of its patterning and recurring “form constants”
at all levels of the physical universe.
These then are some of the spirituality fragments
that might be re-activated in a future globalized culture of
technology in which many persons would find themselves
economically superfluous and so forced into exactly
the situation of detachment, passivity, and experiential
receptivity that would favor a more interior openness.
While many, as increasingly seen today, would drift into
patterns of withdrawal and self-destructive drug use, there
would be sufficient persons of high creativity to synthesize
some or all of these influences into a new more planetary
spirituality. Simone Weil’s own original essentializing of a
mystical Christianity already shows some of this synthesis,
along with the deep personal suffering in attempting its
enactment in the world as she found it.

suffering, where all personal will is surrendered to a
“soul killing despair” (Weil, 1947/2002). Only then can
God’s emptiness, since God is non-existent within space
and time, fill the inner void left of the ordinary self. Her
later notebooks (1950/1970, 1956) show her well aware
of the resonance here with the Buddhist noble truths of
suffering, no self, and shunyata.5
Weil formalized her experiences in terms
of a negative theology—itself evocative of Eckhart,
Kabbalah, and Ibn ‘Arabî—in which creation is
understood as God’s withdrawal in order that existence
could be. Firmly rejecting the implicit pantheism often
associated with such understanding, she saw the physical
universe and ordinary human life as thereby ruled by a
“metallic,” amoral, mechanistic necessity—symbolized
by a physics of “gravity.” Our personal self is part of that
mechanism, and Grace cannot appear within us if we are
attached at all to self or social world, but only when we
become emptied, and so mirroring the God of creation.
Only with that surrender to non-being, which is forced
on us by the direct experience of a dull, despair-inducing
“metallic coldness” in the pure mechanism of affliction,
can the Godlike emptiness and silence within be loved
by the similarly non-existent God of creation, and so be
filled with joy.

The Mystical Theology of Simone Weil
onsistent with the traditional purgation/
illumination, death/rebirth structure of mystical
and shamanic openings (Laski, 1961; Walsh, 2007),
Simone’s opening to the direct sense of an encompassing
presence of Jesus, beginning in 1938, came only when
the severity of her physical exhaustion and migraines,
while recovering from her attempt to bypass neo-Marxist
theory with her own factory work, had reached the point
where she was contemplating suicide. She concluded
that God’s grace and its redeeming joy can only descend
in such states of extreme “affliction” beyond ordinary

Weil, in a way reminiscent of Almaas (2004),
insists that we cannot fill the “holes” of suffering with
imaginary consolation or religious dogma of any kind,
other than complete surrender to one’s pain. Otherwise
we do not empty ourselves to be like God, and it is
this ultimate unknowability and emptiness that makes
ordinary religious belief a “hindrance to true faith”:
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It is in affliction itself that the splendor of God’s
mercy shines . . . . If we fall to the point where the
soul cannot keep back the cry “my God, why hast
thou forsaken me” . . . we end by touching . . . the
very love of God. (Weil, 1951/2009, p. 44)
God can love in us only this consent to withdraw
in order to make way for him, just as . . . our creator
withdrew in order that we might come into being.
(Weil, 1947/2002, p. 41)

In this sense atheism is a purification. . . . Among
those men in whom the supernatural part has not
awakened, the atheists are right and the believers
wrong. (Weil, 1947/2002, p. 115)

Hunt

Significantly for what will later unfold for her, Weil
also insists that we cannot choose the Cross, it must
be inflicted. Otherwise it becomes the deliberately
sought imaginary consolation of martyrdom, with
a false certainty of redemption or afterlife, and so an
unconscious “idolatry.” So for Weil the death on the
Cross is more divine than any consoling dogma of
resurrection. The anticipatory joy and certainty of the
martyr is not the despair of the Cross.
Weil (1950/1970) also has her own version
of spirituality as intrinsic to the human condition, an
inherent capacity that must unfold in some way—
idolatrous or not—in ages religious and secular:
One has only the choice between God and idolatry.
. . . For the faculty of worship is in us, and it is either
directed somewhere into this world, or into the other.
. . . If one denies God, either one is worshipping him
unknown to oneself or else one is worshipping . . .
things of this world [and] . . . imagining the attributes
of Divinity in them. (p. 138)
Here would be her echo of spirituality as inherent
intelligence, and her rejection of all views of its supposed
evolutionary anachronism.
Although Weil’s theological formulation of
suffering can sound extreme, it is actually its own version
of more recent research on the settings associated with
spontaneous ecstatic states and peak experience. Taylor
(2013) finds personal crisis to be by far the most frequent
setting or trigger for ecstasy. Next in frequency comes the
beauty of physical nature, and while it may contradict her
views on its coldness and indifference, Weil found a divine
beauty in the Greek and especially Pythagorean sciences of
physical and mathematical form. While only occasionally
mentioning the more tangible beauty central to a Thoreau
or Emerson, she understood the beauty of the patterns
and forms in nature as inspired by their “obedience” to
divine wisdom.6 The third most frequent setting for
ecstatic experience is meditation, and here Weil discusses
a “total attention” to one’s unfolding situation, which she
also compares to the “suchness” of Zen Buddhism. If that
attention is “without memory, hope, or desire” it allows
the “I” to disappear into a “thy will be done”—necessary
both for the acceptance of suffering and for the awareness
of beauty within Creation. Thus in terms of the overview
of research on the settings for spontaneous ecstasy
(Taylor, 2013; Laski, 1961), Weil offers the framework
for a complete mystical system. James (1902) might well
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have regarded her as a major example of his spontaneous
“genius of the religious line.”
That said, and not surprisingly for time and
place, there is a darker, in some sense Gnostic and “world
rejecting” aspect running all through her writings—
with the world entirely a place of cold mechanism
and cruelty. Absent is the traditional Judaic-Christian
respect for individual personhood. The personal is
also seen as entirely mechanical, based on relations
of dominance and self esteem. Closest to the sacred
within personal life is “mother love,” but tellingly for an
understanding of her own life (below), even it is finally
“only an image. [It] wears out if all the conditions for
its renewal are lacking” (Weil, 1950/1970, p. 127). It
would be the personal that would remain her lifelong
difficulty. Accordingly a personal after-life would be
pointless, since there is no transcendental reality to the
individual life:
The Last Judgement will be like this—the soul . . .
becomes suddenly convinced beyond all possibility
of doubt that all … [its] ends and actions during life
were illusions, including God . . . . It re-lives … all
the actions of its life, after which, in most cases, it
is seized with horror, desires to be annihilated, and
disappears. (Weil, 1950/1970, p. 152)
Unlike Scheler, Durkheim, or Mead, who saw
spirituality as an abstract intelligence based on the inner
form of society itself (see Hunt, 2016), Weil (1951/2005)
adopts Plato’s view in The Republic of society as the
“Great Beast,” a barrier to the Divine greater even than
carnal desire of the body. For Weil it is the same as
Revelations’ “beast of the apocalypse.” Social virtues can
seem to approach the truth, but all are ultimately false,
apart from humility:
The almost inevitable trap is the social one.
Everywhere … the social feeling produces a perfect
imitation of faith, that is to say perfectly deceptive.
(Weil, 1951/2009, p. 129)
We will see below how she might have arrived personally
at the extremity of such views, but Weil is definite that
nothing offered in the social order is worth living for.
Genuine love for others, central to her own personal
altruism, must be for the Godlike void within them:
“Apart from this kind of love, all human relationships
are ghoulish. To love someone means to love drinking
his blood” (Weil, 1950/1970, p. 285).
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Accordingly it becomes clear why she could
not join the Catholic Church, despite her lengthy and
agonized discussions with Fathers Perrin and Thibon
(1952/2003), and fervent wish to do so. It was for
her finally a social organization. In her final writing
(1949/2002), she makes clear that despite the inner truths
of mystics like Francis of Assisi and John of the Cross and
the unjustly persecuted Marcion and Christian Gnostics,
the Church of Rome had transformed the Grace of God
into the rule of the Roman emperor:
[Rome] adopted Christianity only after emptying
it of its spiritual content. Under their rule, every
human activity without exception became something
servile . . . . God [becomes] the infinite equivalent
of a Roman slave-holder. (Weil, 1949/2002, pp. 275,
293)
And slavery for Weil was a social debasement that
distorted and deformed the soul, rather than opening to
any higher Grace.
Herein emerges an unresolved paradox in this
mystical theology that Father Thibon (2003) saw as a
conflicted dualism, and which would indeed close in on
her in the final months of her life. Weil exalts God while
devaluing Creation, and while for Thibon she attempts
to resolve this by the paradox of a world empty of God
betokening the higher in-existence of God’s emptiness, it
does not explain the dedication of her continuing social
and political involvements after her spiritual opening.
She added an exhausting period as a farm laborer to her
earlier factory work, replaced her initial pacifism in
the face of an emerging Nazism with dedication to the
French resistance, celebrated the beginning collapse
of the French colonial empire, and finished her widely
respected writings of political theory with The Need for
Roots—written at the behest of the French government in
exile as part of its plan for a post war national culture. Why
continue to work within the Beast for a social amelioration
that can never finally succeed? Her only direct address of
this seeming contradiction of her continuing dedication
to a social order whose higher value she utterly rejected
comes from her notes collected in Gravity and Grace
(1947/2002):
We must eliminate affliction as much as we can from
social life, for affliction only serves the purposes of
Grace, and society is not a society of the elect. There
will always be enough affliction for the elect. (p. 158)

6

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

So Weil separates the spiritual significance of individual
person and society. The proper locus for a potential
mystical spirituality is the individual and his/her
affliction, while economic hardship, warfare, and
starvation on the level of mass society can only debase
and distort that very potential within each person—
including finally herself.
The Life of Simone Weil
t should not be surprising to see in Weil’s non
traditional struggle toward a New Age mystical
Christianity similar meta-pathological issues also found
in related transitional figures such as Jung, Reich, and
Heidegger (Hunt, 2003). Weil added her own long term
personal issues to the inevitable conflicts stirred up by
her highly original spiritual realization.
“An Impression of Strangeness and Melancholy”
A sequence of early traumas in attachment
and basic trust echo forward through Weil’s life—only
partially and temporarily alleviated in her later openings
to Grace. While not in any way explaining what
amounts to a highly original universalizing of a mystical
Christianity, they reflect continuities of personal
meaning that can become all the more destabilizing
where genuinely new ecstatic opening must lack
institutional support and the longer established safety
and security of tradition (see Hunt, 2003). In the end
it was the very intensity and ambivalence of her later
attempts to join the Catholic Church that show how
inwardly alone she had become.
Petrement (1976), her closest long term friend,
learned from the family that when Simone was six months
old—an especially significant period for early infantmother attachment—severe illness in her mother caused
an abrupt stoppage of nursing, although she continued
to be visible at a distance for the baby. The impact seems
to have been severe, with Simone, hitherto healthy and
developing normally, from then on often sickly, with
long term difficulties in sleeping, food aversions, and
anxieties over eating which meant that until the age
of three solid foods had to be ground up and given by
bottle. A second traumatic layering occurred when at
four she was hospitalized with appendicitis, leaving a
residual and long remembered sense of betrayal over her
mother deceiving her over where she was going. Around
the age of six she began to deny herself candies and
desserts after learning of the suffering of the soldiers in
World War I. By itself this would chiefly be evidence of
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an early ethical precocity, had it not begun her later adult
pattern of anorexia and self starvation over the suffering
of workers and the colonized third world.
It is important to remember that very young
children who undergo trauma, especially as intensified
by heightened emotional sensitivity (Miller, 1997), will
blame themselves for their pain, often developing an
extreme sense of guilt and inadequacy—perhaps further
attested in Weil by her childhood explanation, after
hearing about “germs,” for avoiding physical contact
“owing to my extreme disgustingness” (Petrement, 1976).
At the same time her later childhood family relations,
according to Petrement, were unusually warm and full of
a playful humor. She became especially close to her older
brother, with whom she strongly identified, and with
whom she shared a joint mischievousness, and an equal
intellectual precocity.
This more idyllic interlude came to an end with
a severe adolescent crisis, beginning at age 14, when
in contrast to her brother, who later became a gifted
mathematician, she failed her initial exam to enter the
École Nationale, and withdrew into a “bottomless
despair.” Despite her later success as a student of
philosophy and political theory, she emerged from this
period permanently changed. She became strikingly
solitary, with what Father Thibon (2003) later called
her “impression of strangeness and melancholy”—and a
pattern of behavior at least reminiscent of an Asperger’s
continuum, with a physical clumsiness, marked social
awkwardness, and intensifying food aversions. There was
also a rejection of all things bodily in the form of her
lifelong genderless clothing, minimalizing of her actual
attractiveness, and a seemingly permanent avoidance of
sexuality. Once in university, she engaged in her insistent
political discussions with a dogmatic inflectionless
monotone, and was largely avoided by most fellow
students as arrogant and dismissive (Petrement, 1976).
Nonetheless, and of some significance for what
was to follow, others, becoming better acquainted,
saw the altruism and self sacrifice of a “secular saint.”
Certainly many later thought so (Rees, 1966; Petrement,
1976).7 Yet she also found her own outward social
awkwardness extremely painful. She later described the
extreme humiliation she had always felt when others
found this amusing, comparing it to hens automatically
attacking any wounded member of the flock. She wrote
to Father Perrin how she would “take a knife and cut
out the friendship without warning” whenever she saw
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their laughter as a more conscious cruelty—which by
implication she was often forced to conclude (Weil,
1951/2009, p. 112). One begins to understand her later
view of society as Beast.
Beginning in 1934 Weil shifted from her by
then well known neo-Marxist political writings, well
regarded by such as Bataille (Suriya, 2002), to her direct
engagement with the conditions of factory work. Her
physical slowness and clumsiness, combined with a
continuing self starvation, and deep upset at the absence
of human dignity of such work, led to her exhaustion
and collapse, and the first of her mother’s several later
interventions and enforced recovery in the family home.
Her mother had to intervene again after her abortive
insistence on joining a fighting unit during the Spanish
civil war, with her fellow soldiers greatly relieved when
her severe cooking injury ended her obtuse insistence
on endangering their combat missions with her physical
awkwardness. It was during these years that her chronic
migraines and near-starvation induced exhaustion
were so severe that she contemplated suicide. And it
was during a recovery trip with her mother to Italy in
1937, now unable to return even to teaching philosophy
owing to her permanent exhaustion, that she began
to be deeply moved by church liturgy, music, and the
passion of the crucifixion. This led to her first mystical
openings to the felt presence of Jesus while reciting the
Lord’s Prayer:
At times the very first words . . . transport [me] to
a place outside space. . . . Space opens up . . . Filling
every part of this infinity, there is silence, a silence
. . . more positive than that of sound . . . Sometimes
[then] Christ is present with me in person.
(Petrement, 1976, p. 439)
By 1942 she had fully articulated her original version
of a universalized mystical Christianity, along with its
synthesis with Plato, Stoicism, and aspects of Eastern
meditative traditions.8 The sustained inner joy of these
experiences at least temporarily alleviated the worst of
her migraines.
The Gradual Closing
of an Original Spiritual Opening
ne would expect that the purgation/illumination
structuring of major spiritual openings must reevoke similarly diffuse earlier personal and childhood
issues as part of their potential assimilation and
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healing. So it is not surprising that in addition to her
special fascination with the Eucharist, her writings and
notebooks are full of imagery and metaphor based on
hunger, food deprivation, an infant crying for its absent
mother—all evoking her sense of an absent God who
only redeems a deprivation truly accepted:
If a soul cried to God . . . like a new-born child whom
its mother forgets to feed . . . . May those cries which
I raised when I was a week or two old continue
incessantly within me for that milk which is the seed
of the Father . . . . Treat the lower part of the soul
like a child which one leaves to cry until it is tired
and stops. In the whole universe nothing pays any
attention to it . . . . When this has been impressed on
them many times a note of despair comes into their
cries; they are weary before they begin their crying.
(Weil, 1950/1970, pp. 99, 230-231)
God’s absence here below is the same thing as the
secret presence upon earth of the God who is in
heaven . . . . [His] very silence as something infinitely
more full of significance than any response. (Weil,
1951/2005, p. 199)
Here the presence of God is felt as the void or silence
of his absence, just as when an infant’s cries for nursing
must go unanswered while a loving mother is still both a
concerned presence and an absence.
It is important to stress that these themes of early
attachment imprinted within Weil’s life and writings
should not be seen as somehow the cause of her spiritual
opening, within which they might rather have been
finally reconciled and redeemed. One could remove all
such imagery without in any way changing the structure
of her mystical theology—while Eckhart and Ibn ‘Arabî
echo her similarly absent/inexistent God with no reason
to posit any particular childhood or social context for
them. Where these themes of infant deprivation and
childhood abandonment do become causal is not in her
spiritual opening itself but in its later closing—such that
she rejects all social support and finally starves herself to
death.
By the time she had relocated to New York, to
escape with her parents Vichy France, and was applying
to work with the French government in exile in London,
her earlier states of joy and grace shift, along with the
increasing severity of her headaches, into the despair
of what might be regarded as a premature Dark Night.
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She prays for the wisdom to accept God’s abandonment
“to the pitiless necessity of matter and the cruelty of the
devil” (Weil, 1950/1970, p. 103). Father Thibon (2003)
would later suggest, based on her letters, that the earlier
detachment he had so admired had been replaced by an
“indifference from exhaustion” and that her intensified
self-preoccupation and unconscious pride in her own
suffering had created a “loss of balance” and “vertigo.”
Max Weber (1922/1963) in discussing the sort
of “this worldly” mysticism Weil is attempting to enact,
stresses its characteristic “broken humility”—since
heightened openness and sensitivity must unfold not
in monastery or wilderness but amidst the frustrations
and barriers of everyday social existence. Genuine
spiritual humility seems to have a quality of gentleness,
humor, and ironic self-acceptance often associated with
Taoism (see Giles, 1947). A danger, in terms of the
transpersonal psychology of Almaas (2004), becomes
the confusion of that humility with a more personal
identity of deficiency and inadequacy. Here an earlier
sublimation of felt deficiency into the inner emptiness
of mystical poverty—as in Weil’s view of her “extreme
difficulty in carrying out the simplest action” as a gift
of Grace (Weil, 1956, p. 300)—can descend back into
an unconsciously intensified self hatred. Thus we find
what many have regarded as her truly awful prayer
of self sacrifice, while waiting to leave for London, in
which, to forebear from quoting it directly, she prays for
paralysis, loss of all sensation, mental dementia, and loss
of any capacity to love or care for others, all in order to
become a “nothingness” finally “devoured by God” as
“nourishment” for those who are afflicted.
Once in London in 1943, and writing The Need
for Roots for the French government in exile, her personal
issues intensified. Despite her earlier understanding that
God’s Grace cannot be sought through any deliberate
martyrdom, she had conceived a secret mission in which
she would be dropped behind enemy lines in France
to help the Resistance. Her response to the repeated
observation that her social awkwardness and physical
appearance would entail not only her own, essentially
suicidal, death but that of anyone else involved, was met
only by deep hurt, anger, and bitterness.9 She insisted
on buying her own parachute anyway and threatened
to kill herself if her carefully worked out plan was
ever undertaken without her. Finally she resigned the
position, one that had been rather exceptionally granted
to her, in protest.
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A diagnosis of tuberculosis, which her doctor felt
was curable if she would begin to eat adequately, which
she refused to do “while France is suffering” (Petrement,
1976), necessitated her hospitalization and growing
weakness. In the end she died of cardiac arrest from
overall weakness a few days after turning her face away
from her visiting friend and former supervisor, saying
to him that he “had not been a good enough friend”
(Petrement, 1976, p. 533). One gets the sad impression
of a kind of attempted emotional blackmail, that in the
absence of the rescuing mother forced by the war to
remain in New York, became an irreversible and terminal
anorexia.10 In her own earlier terms, she had chosen a
lesser martyrdom in an attempt to coerce a higher Grace.

before her spiritual opening in terms of her ethical and
political altruism, and afterwards in the originality of
her mystical theology (Rees, 1966; Petrement, 1976).
It follows that such a saint—however conceived—
will be especially sensitive to human suffering. To the
extent that patterns of neurosis and psychosis are the
ubiquitous final common pathways of suffering, sainthood will create its own exacerbation of these patterns
as its higher by-product—precisely in the sense that
Maslow (1971) understood the “meta-pathologies” of
self actualization and James (1902) wrote of specifically
spiritual pathologies as “theopathies.” Here genius,
and Weil as in James’ terms a “genius of the religious
line,” will create its own pathologies as much as, and/or
attendant with, the other way around.
Weil’s social awkwardness and obtuseness then
become less examples of an Aspergers-like continuum
than the consequence of a hyper-sensitivity and capacity
for attentive absorption in the implicit foundations of
social consciousness that, with Wittgenstein (1969) and
the social theorist Alfred Schutz (1962), must normally
remain as an implied and tacit background if we are to
function within the everyday pragmatic social order. Weil
(1956) herself seems to have had some such intimation:

Conclusions
hese considerations of the life and work of Simone
Weil raise a complex array of issues: transpersonal,
more purely personal and interpretive, historical, and
the cognitive and social bases of spirituality—both as an
intrinsic human capacity and for any New Age to come.
1) Given the genuine brilliance and widespread
influence of Simone Weil’s mystical and potentially
universalized Christianity, it is impossible to avoid the
conclusion that something truly terrible happened here.
Her last years became a startlingly direct illustration of
what Almaas (2004) has termed flight to transcendence
and the transpersonal psychologist Welwood (2000)
spiritual bypass, in which a major spiritual opening leads
to an escape from and even dissociation of personal
issues, rather than their assimilation and healing. That
would have been the optimal outcome of a spiritual
crisis associated with traditional mystical/shamanic
development, not for nothing termed purgation/
illumination, and often compared to an induced psychosis
(Walsh, 2007). Where issues of personal trauma and
dilemma are not assimilated the result must be the sort
of distortion and shutting down of realization we see at
the very end of Weil’s life. This becomes the perpetual
risk of any major and original spiritual realization in its
larger attempt at the transformation and redeeming of
collective human suffering.
2) Still, what if Simone Weil actually was a
saint? Perhaps she also needs to be considered in that
light, whether in a traditional revelatory sense or in
terms of a precocity of the inborn temperament of
a later spiritual intelligence, akin to the prodigies of
music or mathematics. Many have thought so, both

Here her social peculiarities and “impression of
strangeness” becomes what both allows and is also the
result of a rare capacity for a meditative awareness into
the roots of social connection, including the high price
of individual moral rightness in the face of the largely
unconscious “might” of social opinion and the tacit
actualities of power—as in the reality of Weil’s Beast.11
Such an analysis is not to deny, but may even
entail, an actual incapacity for personal relations and
understanding of specific others, not resolved by her
spiritual opening and perhaps intensified. Both her long
term friend Petrement (1976) and Father Thibon (2003),
while deeply respectful of the altruism of the sustained
help she so often offered to those she encountered, also
saw her severe limitations in personal empathy. She
tended to project her own mentality onto those she
assisted, failing to perceive them as separate individuals

Life and Work of Simone Weil

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

T

The extreme difficulty that I often experience in
carrying out the simplest action is a favour that has
been granted me. . . . One must not ask that this
difficulty should disappear; but on the contrary
ardently desire . . . for the grace to be able to make
use of it. (p. 300)

9

in their own right. Indeed, personality and social relations
are reduced to “mechanism” within her understanding
of a mystical Christianity. This impersonality seems
especially ironic if any future syncretism of Christianity
with Eastern meditative and naturalistic New Age
traditions, while it might reflect Weil in dispensing
with a personal after-life, would need to include what
many have seen as a uniquely Christian emphasis on the
sacredness of individual personhood. Perhaps tragically,
it is this respect for the unique individual, so evident in
the synoptic gospels (see Hunt, 2012), the Sufi path of
return (Toussulis, 2010), and Almaas (2004) on “personal
essence,” and for Weber (1922/1963) secularized within
his globalized “spirit of capitalism,” that is missing from
Weil’s Christianity.
3) In seeking to understand what finally shut
down Weil’s essentialization of a Christian mysticism,
as its own partial intuition of a spiritual New Age so
similarly foreseen by Teilhard de Chardin and Toynbee,
it is important to realize that in addition to whatever the
distortions of her spirituality that would impinge on Weil
from the encompassing diffuseness of early trauma, one
must also add, on a societal level, the diffuse foreboding
throughout the 1930s created by the disarray and pending
destruction leading into World War II. Weil, herself
Jewish, is not the only progenitor of a futural New Age
during that time to run together and succumb to a
confusion of personal and collective passions. Where
Weil, on the political left, comes to see her own personal
martyrdom as solution to a collective spiritual crisis,
Heidegger and Jung, on the more conservative right, at
least for a time confused their own personal grandiosity
with a mythically romanticized version of National
Socialism (see Hunt, 2003). In all three one sees versions
of a “flight to transcendence” to escape both personal and
social disarray.
Weil herself understood the war as portending a
larger spiritual crisis for the West. While still in the south
of France, she writes:
What is happening to humanity at the present
time is like what happens to a man in whom
affliction has, from without, partially killed the “I.”
Contemporary events are in process of destroying
in mankind as a whole part of the energy available
for the transmutation into spiritual energy, and
there is no way of repairing this loss. Contemporary
events are an affliction, and that is an unalterable
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fact. We have got to contemplate this affliction in all
its bitterness and without consolation, while loving
God as the author of all things—amongst which this
very affliction—and at the same time as the author
exclusively of good. (Weil, 1956, p. 352)
She goes on to speculate that if these “blind forces” were to
destroy Christianity in its present form, “new revelations”
would follow, since the historical Jesus should be included
with Lao Tzu, Buddha, Krishna of the Gita, and John
of the Cross within the framework of any notion of a
divinely inspired human incarnation.12
4) That conclusion would also follow on
the view of spirituality as the abstract level of a basic
social-personal intelligence, juxtaposed in all human
cultures against an intelligence of physical “things”
and technology—Weil’s Grace vs. gravity—whose
maximum abstraction is based on mathematics—also
with its own sense of infinity and the limitless (see Hunt,
2009, 2016). These two intelligences, in each culture
and era of history, are in varying and shifting degrees
of balance or imbalance, integration in a unitive world
view or secularized separation. These intelligences are
both logically distinct—ultimately rooted, with Dilthey
(1883/1988) in the separation of causal explanation and
empathic understanding—but co-dependent on each
other in their inner process.
Given their common roots in Piagetian sensorimotor bases of action, whatever the physical sciences
learn of the universe, the technological implications
of their methods gear back into a purposive telelogical
human order of “use.” Correspondingly, it appears from
the tradition of holistic cognitive psychology extending
from Werner and Kaplan (1963) and Arnheim (1969)
to Lakoff and Johnson (1999) that our capacity to
represent all levels of feeling, including the inner light
of mystical experience, rests on the self-referential reuse of physical metaphor. This re-use is rooted into
the etymologies of words for inner experience in all
languages and extended into each culture’s ongoing
metaphysical reassignment of its understanding,
empathically rendered, of the physical universe (see
Hunt, 2009, 2016). The metaphoric reanimation of the
physical—as in “warm” feelings and hopes “kindled”—
on a more abstract level becomes the basis for the
“nature mysticism” of traditional shamanism, Emerson
and Thoreau, and Weil herself (1968) on the beauty of
natural form as God’s wisdom.
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Formal religion can thus be understood as each
culture’s attempt at an encompassing self representation
of its version of the human condition—symbolically
reflecting the necessarily metaphoric existentials of
feeling in terms channelled within its particular socioeconomic organization and its understanding of the
surrounding physical universe rendered as empathically
animated metaphoric mirror. That self representation is
all encompassing in intent, but necessarily partial and
intrinsically incomplete, since no self-referential formal
system can logically encompass itself (Bronowski, 1971;
Hunt, 2009, 2016). The necessary cultural relativity of
the more specific levels of such religious understanding,
in partial contrast to their more universal mystical or
numinous felt expressions, means that, with Weber
(1922/1963) and Sorokin (1957), the major religions
must undergo periodic secularizations, and a loss of their
intrinsic function to convey a sense of larger purpose and
meaning for human existence. This will occur when socioeconomic conditions and a corresponding understanding
of the physical universe undergo extensive enough
changes to fall outside the self-reflective metaphors of the
traditional religion.
These cyclic periods of secularization and loss
of any larger felt meaning in human existence, and
dichotomous reactions of fundamentalist revival vs. the
New Age numinosities of original visionary movements,
have until modernity remained centered within the
differing ethnic regions of the major world religions of
the first “axial age.” However, Heidegger (1949/2012) and
more recently Harari (2016) foresee, along with many in
the popular media, a new and unprecedented “planetary”
era in which previous cultural traditions become the
anachronistic residues of a technological explosion that
uses both natural and human reality as “commodity” for
a globalized and increasingly elitist capitalist economy,
its only limitations resting on fast approaching ecological
constraints on the planet itself. Meanwhile a digital
revolution of artificial intelligence and expert systems has
reached the point where many foresee perhaps billions of
people as “surplus” and without meaningful function in
present socio-economic terms (Harari, 2016).
Given the present view that human spirituality,
and its cultural formulation as religion, is intrinsic to
human symbolic intelligence, as a more abstract, albeit
difficult to achieve and synthesize Piagetian formal
operations in affect (Hunt, 2016), such a massively
globalized and historically unprecedented intensification

of secular-material values will at some point inspire and
require a similarly globalized spiritual New Age. It is
this that Weil (1956), Jung (1964), Toynbee (1946,
1957), Reich (1949/1973), and Heidegger (1940/2015)
all anticipated. Heidegger (1949/2012) suggested that
the future extension of technology and “machination”
would in itself eventually give rise to a collective sense
of the “uncanny”—since that which had been created by
us for our own increasing convenience and control will
have come to encompass and control our own humanity.
Since the uncanny is itself the most primitive level of
numinous feeling, this would betoken a renewed sense
of the awe, wonder, and humility basic to Rudolf Otto’s
(1917/1958) felt core of the spiritual—whose most full
development appears in the nondual mysticisms as the
most abstract fruition of the traditional religions (Otto,
1932/1962). In short those figures are foreseeing a new
axial age on a planetary scale as an inherent response to the
growing imbalance of person and thing intelligences in our
exaggeratedly material and “sensate” age—in Heidegger’s
terms a futural “new beginning” and advent of a “last god.”
It may become an irony of the isolating effects of
billions of “surplus” persons in a technologized, digitally
automated economy that it produces just the conditions,
in terms of Weber’s typology of religious movements, for
the more individualized forms of this-worldly mysticism,
transpersonalism, and neo-shamanisms and their
emphasis on the direct experience of numinous ecstasy,
rather than the more communal prophetical-ethical
traditions. While the loss of meaning on a collective
level also must create the schizoid detachment and social
disengagement that both Sass (1992) and Deleuze and
Guattari (1987) saw as the “schizophrenogenic” nature
of modern culture, along with widespread social anomie
and the self-destructive use of anomie intensifying drugs
such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, it would
also allow other individuals to cultivate the more creative
meditative, neo-shamanic, and psychedelic methods
that would be central to a spiritual New Age.
It is in this more generalized context of a new
sensate or this-worldly mysticism foreseen by the later
Heidegger (1940/2015), Jung (1964), and Toynbee
(1957) that Weil can be seen as foreshadowing the sort of
universalizing of Christian mysticism and its incarnating
“on earth as it is in heaven” that would go with related
universalizings of Hinduism by Krishnamurti, Sufism
by Gurdjieff, and Buddhism by much of transpersonal
psychology. This would indeed be a New Age whose
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actual time of arrival as “age,” not “era,” would be as
uncertain in terms of global economics, politics, and
ecology, as the pressures toward it—in human sciences
terms at least—become a more or less predictive certainty.
One of the great virtues of the life and work of
Simone Weil is to show just how difficult that transition
would be, and its likely relevance to our own very
worldwide crisis and the collective affliction many have
seen as well under way.
Notes
1. The present author may not be alone, based on the
major developments in transpersonal psychology and
consciousness studies beginning from the 1960s, in
anticipating that these would open into the spiritual
New Age earlier heralded by figures as diverse as
Jung, Heidegger, Toynbee, Reich, and Krishnamurti.
But the continued separation of transpersonal and
consciousness studies from the mainstream human
sciences, with whatever inclusion restricted to more
circumscribed neurocognitive and questionnaire
methodologies, has left instead a sense of “something
was supposed to happen, but did not.”
		 For this author there has dawned a certain
clarity in coming to distinguish the concept of
“era,” as in that of the 1960s and beyond, from the
longer term concept of an “age.” Any calculation
of the latter must be based on the span of centuries
and the unknown impact of socio-economic and an
unprecedented technological transformation (Harari,
2016). Teilhard de Chardin (1964), anticipating
such a futural New Age, suggested that the initial
effects of such globalization would be exactly the
exacerbation of regional, ethnic, and religious rivalries
we see concurrently. The timing of a new planetary
spirituality under such conditions must remain
intrinsically uncertain, while still fully plausible—to
the extent that spirituality is the higher development
of a social-personal intelligence needed to convey
a larger context of collective purpose and meaning
(Hunt, 2016).
2. The Church prohibition of the publication of
Teilhard de Chardin’s major works until after his
death followed from the biological basis of his New
Age speculations on the future “planetization” of a
“super-consciousness” or “omega point,” synthesizing
the world religions within a broadly Christianized
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3.

4.

5.

6.

spirituality. He understood such an omega point
as the human evolution of Bergson’s (1907/1944)
life energy. Unlike a related usage of Bergson by
Wilhelm Reich (1949/1973), de Chardin pictured
this naturalization of religion as an actual biological
evolution of consciousness—a questionable view
also taken up by Wilber (1995), and in contrast to
the more parsimonious sociocultural understanding
of any such development by Weber (1922/1963),
Sorokin (1957), and Toynbee (1946/1957); see also
Hunt (2003, 2010).
   Weil had extensive discussions on the nature of
mystical experience, while exiled in the south of
Vichy France, with Rene Daumal, one of Gurdjieff’s
major French followers (Petrement, 1976).
While Jung (1958) and Heidegger (Parkes, 1987)
studied Buddhism and Taoism in more detail
than Weil’s more impressionistic comparisons
with her Christian Platonism, all three fall short of
more recent transpersonal studies of these Eastern
traditions. The point here would be that their
more sophisticated understandings are less likely
to translate directly into any future planetary wide
spirituality. It would be their more selective “creative
misunderstanding” and simplification that may
better forecast the broader syncretisms of a more
distant future.
There has been debate in later discussions of Weil
over any cultural “anti-Semitism” in her distaste
for the violence and destruction in much of the
Old Testament, and her avoiwedly, albeit original,
Christian theology (Petrement, 1976; Yourgrau,
2011). It is important to note, however, that her
family, while agnostic, considered itself Jewish, she
did not finally convert to Catholicism, and she often
cites with deep appreciation the Psalms, Proverbs,
and especially the Book of Job, which with Jung
(1958) later, she sees as a direct anticipation of the
Cross. There is some risk of historical anachronism
in applying post-holocaust understandings of antisemitism to the complexities and range of Jewish
identity in pre-war Europe.
  A nticipating the more recent work of Pierre Hadot
(2006), Weil rejected a modern science of “inner
mechanism” for a return to a science of pattern and
form. For Weil (1951/2005,1968) this would be a
Pythagorean science based on an original Greek
understanding of geometry and mathematics.
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A case for its plausibility has been addressed by
Morgan (2005).
7.   In this regard it is interesting to compare Weil, in
the years before her mystical opening, to two other
secular Jews of that era, Ludwig Wittgenstein (here
see also Yourgrau, 2011) and Franz Kafka, both of
whom exemplified in conduct and sensibility what
one might term the abstract form of Max Weber’s
“this-worldly” mystical attitude (Shields, 1993;
Janouch, 1971), but without the direct ecstatic
realizations that would later dominate Weil’s life.
In all three, one finds a secular mysticism of the
sacredness of everyday reality. This recurrence in a
secular context of a spiritually oriented life, without
any culturally supportive system of belief and ritual,
is consistent with a view of spirituality as its own
intelligence—a formal operations in affect difficult
to fully realize even with traditionally established
cultural guidance (Hunt, 2016).
8. The conceptual rigor of Weil’s integration of these
multiple traditions and the precise logic of her
crossrelating of her key concepts of love, grace,
suffering, affliction, attention, and existence, along
with the non dogmatic force of these writings,
has over time attracted the deeply respectful
commentaries of Wittgensteinian linguistic
philosophers such as Drury (1973), Winch (1989),
Phillips (1993), and Rhees (2000). These authors
also tend to agree on her personal similarities to
the austere intensity of Wittgenstein’s own inner
spirituality (Shields, 1993).
9.   Given her long fascination with the BhagavadGita (Yutang, 1942), wherein a pacific Arjuna
struggles with God’s will that he go to war, and her
commentary from her notebooks (Weil, 1956, p.
145) that an emptiness truly attuned to God’s grace
will not come from renouncing action itself, but
rather from any attachment to the fruits or outcome
of that action, it seems plausible to conclude that
for her it was not the concrete results of her suicide
mission that would matter, but only its value as
a gesture to inspire others. Certainly this is the
spirit of some more general passages on the war in
her final The Need for Roots. Yet she seemed happy
enough to include the inspiratory deaths of her
fellow underground members as well. It is difficult
to see her mission as other than her own choice of
the martyrdom she had earlier so rejected, hoping

instead that her inevitable capture and execution
would force a final descent of God’s Grace—which
she had earlier better understood as beyond either
choice or compulsion.
10. Petrement (1976) did suggest that by the time of her
final diagnosis, with recovery dependent on a return
to normal eating, Weil’s progressive anorexia may
have made this physiologically impossible during
those last weeks.
11. On a personal note, perhaps shared by some readers,
who am I to judge? Analogous to research articles
that must alert the reader to any vested interest
of the author, a life-history analysis such as this
should similarly acknowledge any similarly relevant
“counter-transference.” Accordingly, what I do know
is how similar my own childhood and infant traumas
are to Weil. My own version of first seeing her Beast
of the social seems best epitomized in my stunned
watching of several childhood “friends” laughing at
and mocking the local “retarded” boy weeping in
the street over the death of his just run-over dog. I
can certainly see how Weil’s early awareness of the
suffering within society could leave one “ill at ease,”
socially awkward, and “detached.” So in the spirit
of vested counter-transference, this author must also
confess his deep personal distress over Weil’s final
inversion of her spiritual insights and experiences
of Grace. It underlines the intrinsic vulnerability
of a spiritual intelligence, and, not withstanding
her own more deep seated interpersonal difficulties,
makes me fear for us all.
12. Consistent with Weil’s mystical Christianity and her
rejection of the Roman dominion that had falsely
eliminated the earlier diversity of competing Gnostic
Christianities, Toynbee (1956) suggested that any
universalist revival of Christianity in a civilization of
the future would only be fully recognizable to these
earliest historical followers. Weil herself had already
bypassed the dogmatic exclusivities of both Roman
Church and Reformation, which for Toynbee had
originally blocked the wider historical acceptance of
Christianity by non-Western cultures. It would be
the secularized capitalism and individualism of the
West that later became the basis for our contemporary
socio-economic globalization (Toynbee, 1956),
at least outwardly separated from what Weber
(1922/1963) famously saw as the Protestant roots of
his “spirit of capitalism.”
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